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Took a while but I've discovered what I want/need for IPv6 dynamic iBGP peering with Cilium just isn't possible without hacking around OPNsense a bit.

Well, at least I *know* now it's not doable. Tweaking settings semi-blindly and poking logs wasn't exactly fulfilling.

As is par for the course I've found the GitHub issue for it closed by a stalebot.

#IPv6#BGP#Networking
Ha risposto nella discussione

@fleaz : it's not MultiMultiFactorAuthentication but 1FA max.

Assuming that you don't use those hardware keys to generate TOTP codes (which are pointless when confronted with the likes of #Evilginx2), but use WebAuthn instead (FIDO2 passkeys in hardware keys), everything depends on one factor: the domain name of the website.

1️⃣ DV-CERTS SUCK
It is not very common that certificates are issued to malicious parties, but it *does* happen now and then (infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStrat).

2️⃣ SUBDOMAINS
Furthermore, sometimes organizations have "dangling" subdomain names. For example,

test.example.com

may point to the IP-adress of some cloud server no longer used by example.com. Anyone with write access to that server may install a fake "test.example.com" website and phish you to it. It *may* be used to phish your WebAuthm credentials *if* "example.com" does not explicitly *DENY* WebAuthn from "test.example.com".

See github.com/w3ctag/design-revie for how Google prevents "sites.google.com" from authenticating to "google.com".

3️⃣ DNS HACKED
It may not be neccessary to execute BGP-hijacks to redirect network traffic to an impostor: it also all depends on how reliable DNS records are protected against unauthorized access. If the dude in charge for DNS uses a stupid password only, or the DNS provider is easily fooled into believing "I forgot my creds", it's game over. The crooks will obtain a DV-cert in no time, no questions asked, for free.

4️⃣ All the bells and whistless are moot if there's an alternative way to log in (such as by using a 1FA rescue code) and the user is fooled into providing it (after they've been lied to that their WebAithn public key on the server became corrupted or was lost otherwise).

5️⃣ Cloudflare MitM's https connections (it's not a secret: blog.cloudflare.com/password-r). The same applies to any server you log in to, which is accessible by untrustworthy personnel. They can steal your session cookie.

6️⃣ In the end MFA/2FA is a hoax anyway, because the session cookie (or JWT or whatever) is 1FA anyway.

Did I mention the risks of account lockout with hardware keys that cannot be backupped? And the mess it is to keep at least one other hardware key synchronized if it's in a vault? And the limitation of, for example, 25 WebAuthn accounts max? And (unpatcheable) vulnerabilities found in hardware keys? And their price? And how easy it is to forget or loose them?

@odr_k4tana

Infosec ExchangeErik van Straten (@ErikvanStraten@infosec.exchange)🌘DV-CERT MIS-ISSUANCE INCIDENTS🌒 🧵#3/3 Note: this list (in reverse chronological order) is probably incomplete; please respond if you know of additional incidents! 2024-07-31 "Sitting Ducks" attacks/DNS hijacks: mis-issued certificates for possibly more than 35.000 domains by Let’s Encrypt and DigiCert: https://blogs.infoblox.com/threat-intelligence/who-knew-domain-hijacking-is-so-easy/ (src: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/sitting-ducks-dns-attacks-let-hackers-hijack-over-35-000-domains/) 2024-07-23 Let's Encrypt mis-issued 34 certificates,revokes 27 for dydx.exchange: see 🧵#2/3 in this series of toots 2023-11-03 jabber.ru MitMed/AitMed in German hosting center https://notes.valdikss.org.ru/jabber.ru-mitm/ 2023-11-01 KlaySwap en Celer Bridge BGP-hijacks described https://www.certik.com/resources/blog/1NHvPnvZ8EUjVVs4KZ4L8h-bgp-hijacking-how-hackers-circumvent-internet-routing-security-to-tear-the 2023-09-01 Biggest BGP Incidents/BGP-hijacks/BGP hijacks https://blog.lacnic.net/en/routing/a-brief-history-of-the-internets-biggest-bgp-incidents 2022-09-22 BGP-hijack mis-issued GoGetSSL DV certificate https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2022/09/how-3-hours-of-inaction-from-amazon-cost-cryptocurrency-holders-235000/ 2022-09-09 Celer Bridge incident analysis https://www.coinbase.com/en-nl/blog/celer-bridge-incident-analysis 2022-02-16 Crypto Exchange KLAYswap Loses $1.9M After BGP Hijack https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/crypto-exchange-klayswap-loses-19m-after-bgp-hijack-a-18518 🌘BACKGROUND INFO🌒 2024-08-01 "Cloudflare once again comes under pressure for enabling abusive sites (Dan Goodin - Aug 1, 2024) https://arstechnica.com/security/2024/07/cloudflare-once-again-comes-under-pressure-for-enabling-abusive-sites/ 2018-08-15 Usenix-18: "Bamboozling Certificate Authorities with BGP" https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/birge-lee Edited 2024-09-05 14:19 UTC: corrected the link for the "jabber.ru" incident. #DV #LE #LetsEncrypt #Certificates #Certs #Misissuance #Mis_issuance #Revocation #Revoked #Weaknessess #WeakCertificates #WeakAuthentication #Authentication #Impersonation #Identification #Infosec #DNS #DNSHijacks #SquareSpace #Authorization #UnauthorizedChanges #UnauthorizedModifications #DeFi #dydx_exchange #CryptoCoins
#1FA#2FA#MFA

Association entre adresse IP et AS

Dans les discussions au sujet du réseau Internet, on voit souvent passer des demandes sur l'AS associé à une adresse IP ou bien le contraire. Mais les questions simples du genre « de quel AS dépend une adresse IP ? » sont… trop simples.

bortzmeyer.org/association-as-

www.bortzmeyer.orgBlog Stéphane Bortzmeyer: Association entre adresse IP et AS
#BGP#whois#RDAP

Our Tor exit relays have been successfully migrated to our new network; AS401401. We're nearing completion of the initial stages of our project to make traffic correlation attacks against the Tor network even harder!

bgp.tools/as/401401

metrics.torproject.org/rs.html

bgp.toolsAS401401 Unredacted Inc - bgp.toolsUnredacted Inc (AS401401) is a BGP network that is peering with 9 other networks and has 8 upstream carriers